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In some ways we have come a long way from Locke’s story of the Dutch 
ambassador’s account of weather so cold that it freezes water so hard that an 
elephant could stand on it [and upon hearing the story, the King of Siam 
responding: 'Hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, 
because I look upon you as a sober fair man; but now I am sure you lie' 
(1688/1978: 33)]1 or of similar stories, such as from The Lion, the Witch and 
the Wardrobe (1950)2, of probability and reliable witnessing. Much recent 
theoretical labour, especially in the fields of science and technology studies 
and cultural theory and some sub-disciplines of anthropology, has shown how 
the empirical is far from settled in the site of the scientific observer, not only 
inasmuch as the scientist is fallible to social forces, but inasmuch as matter 
observed is agentic, motile and sticky. Matter under the microscope always 
affects the vision of the experimenter. Whether that matter is fixed or only 
known through the traces it leaves, the eye’s vision is always clouded. It is in 
this sense that writers working in these still relatively new fields talk about the 
                                            
1 ‘If I myself see a man walk on ice, it is past probability: it is knowledge. But if another tells me, he saw 
a man in England, in… winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with 
what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed, by the nature of the thing itself, to assent to it… 
But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such 
thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony; and as the relators are more in number, 
and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth; so the matter of fact is like to find 
more or less belief. Though to a man, whose experience has been always quite contrary, and who has 
never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarcely be able to find belief’ 
(Locke 1688/1978: 336). 
 
2 ‘“How do you know,” he asked, “that your sister’s story is not true?”... Then Susan pulled herself 
together and said, “But Edmund said they had only been pretending.” “That is a point,” said the 
Professor, “which certainly deserves consideration; very careful consideration. [But] does your 
experience lead you to regard your brother or your sister as the more reliable? I mean which is the more 
truthful?... If there really is a door in this house that leads to some other world... if, I say, she had got into 
another world, I should not at all be surprised to find that other world had a separate time of its own; so 
that however long you stay there it would never take up any of our time. On the other hand, I don’t think 
many girls of her age would invent that idea for themselves.”... “But do you really mean, sir,” said Peter, 
“that there could be other worlds – all over the place, just round the corner – like that?” “Nothing is more 
probable,” said the Professor...’ (C. S. Lewis, The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, 1950: 54-7). 
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confusion of epistemological and ontological tongues. Knowing is making and 
doing is being and the kiss of being is uncontained (cf. Callon, Latour, 
Haraway, Law, etc). 
 
In the middle of these translations across knowing and being, the human and 
technological, the natural and social, and the natural sciences and human 
sciences, any history of the modest masculine witness is put in its place in the 
past (Haraway, 1997; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985: Shapin, 1994). And yet I 
think that there is good reason to revisit that past not in order to resurrect old 
debates, but to re-form and in-form present ones. I want to offer a brief and 
cursory genealogical account of the emergence of a domain of children’s 
experience and frame that account in the context of a series of questions about 
the infancy or maturity of the subject of experience. In doing so, I want to say 
a few things about the subject of the empirical and its associational being. 
 
2. Infancy and Experience 
The empirical carries a relationality to ‘maturity’ and to ‘infancy’. Giorgio 
Agamben, in his ‘Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of 
Experience’ provides an account of the philosophical reasoning of experience, 
the subject and maturity running from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. 
He discusses the separation of experience and science in Montaigne and he 
focuses on how death is conceived as the limit of experience; experience is 
conceived in the context of the movement toward death, namely in the context 
of maturity. Then through a discussion from Descartes to Kant to Husserl and 
Heidegger on the relation between the transcendental and the empirical, he 
comes to the twentieth century concern with language and subjectivity. In 
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Freud, Agamben sees a reversal of the relationship between experience and 
maturity, such that the limit of experience is now turned backward to infancy; 
a passage that Agamben also sees in grammatical terms as a turn from the 
first to the third person inasmuch as the primary site of experience is now 
seen as the unconscious. In Benveniste and others, Agamben both 
understands the ‘I’ as textual position and infancy as providing that ‘moat’ 
between language as a system and discourse as utterance. Agamben 
provocatively states that ‘the constitution of the subject in and through 
language is precisely the expropriation of this “wordless” experience; from the 
outset, it is always “speech”. A primary experience, far from being subjective, 
could then only be what in human beings comes before the subject – that is, 
before language: a “wordless” experience in the literal sense of the term, a 
human infancy, whose boundary would be marked by language’ (Agamben, 
2006: 54).  
 
In some ways, albeit unacknowledged, some of Agamben’s text rests on an 
earlier work, Henri Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life: Volume 1. This 
volume, which both criticises the aethetico-politics of surrealism and the 
philosophy of Heidegger, less explicitly and in a much smaller fashion makes 
reference to childhood and the experiences of the everyday. He quotes 
Baudelaire on childhood and the marvellous. For Baudelaire, ‘the child sees 
everything as a novelty’, ‘is always ‘drunk’, has a ‘deep and joyful curiosity’ and 
‘when confronted with something new’ has ‘that stare, animal-like in its 
ecstasy’. The adult who can recapture that childhood at will, has the ‘physical 
means to express’ him or herself, and is able to ‘bring order into the sum of 
experience’ through an ‘analytical mind’ is seen as by Baudelaire as a ‘genius’ 
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(‘The Painter of Modern Life’ quoted in Lefebvre, 1992: 107). In contrast, for 
Rimbaud, Lefebvre tells us there is no need to ‘return to childhood’ for ‘he was 
a genius as a child, and when he was no longer a child, the genius left him’. 
Rimbaud, Lefebvre continues, ‘never reached maturity, the sphere of 
distinctions between intelligence and reason, the senses and the mind, things 
and concepts’. For Rimbaud the ‘symbol and the sensation are no longer 
distinguishable’ (ibid: 109): the poet muses ‘[s]weeter than the flesh of sour 
apples to children, the green water penetrated my pinewood hull... and 
sometimes I saw what men thought they saw...’ (Rimbaud, ‘The Drunken Boat’ 
quoted in Lefebvre, 1992: 109).  
 
For Lefebvre, the turn of the century poets, but also the Surrealists and the 
Magic Realists – those who all bathed in the marvellous everyday – could only 
provide a ‘reactionary’ perspective on everyday experience. Lefebvre offers 
little in the way of a ‘progressive’ understanding of the relationship between 
childhood and quotidian experience though. But he does offer a strange 
footnote to a discussion of the ‘reverse image’ in the films of Charlie Chaplin. 
Children’s fiction, he argues, offers a ‘break with – and transport out of – 
normality’ (ibid: 262), but also ‘the children’s press and children’s literature 
have their own set of themes. Less structured than, and differently structured 
to, the world of the adult, the child’s world does not require the same reverse 
image. In fact there is no world of the child. The child lives in society, and in 
his eyes the adult world is what is strange and marvellous – or odious. Simply 
being a child makes him already a critic of adult everyday life, but it is in this 
everyday life that he must search for his future and disentangle his own 
potential. In the works which are most successful from this point of view, a 
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familiar animal (a dog, a duck, a mouse) supports a reverse image in which the 
trivial changes into fantasy and the fantastic, with an element of explicit 
criticism’ (ibid: 262). 
 
Such views would certainly be at odds with much of contemporary sociology of 
childhood. And that may be no bad thing. But we should be wary of a priori 
aligning childhood and children along a series of binaries between maturity 
and infancy, speech and pure experience, and the mundane and the 
marvellous as if children and childhood could simply signify a world of pre-
social creativity and novelty, a veritable innocence of experience. Such views 
would certainly also be problematic with regards to any attempt to frame the 
issue of children’s rights and political representation. 
 
3. The Emergence of Children as a Collective Experiential Subject 
Sociologists are want to remind us – over and above historical evidence to the 
contrary – that childhood was invented as a social institution within 
conditions of modernity around the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries (Aries, 
Jenks, James and Prout, etc). In the context of a discussion about ‘the 
empirical’, this is significant because it might suggest that a whole new 
domain of experience emerged, not only for children, but for others as well, as 
a correlative of this new sociological category. We can certainly accept some of 
this story, but much is left wanting. 
 
It is from the mid- to late-eighteenth century that a medium emerges through 
which children’s experiences can not only be discussed by adults inquiring as 
to the nature of this type of personhood (something that has happened 
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certainly since the ancients), but also become the site in which children 
themselves can reflect on themselves and give voice to themselves. In 1744 A 
Little Pretty Pocket-Book is published by John Newbery (Darton, 1932). From 
1752 to 1800 eleven periodicals were published for the young of England 
(Drotner, 1988). Across Europe and the US, children’s novels and fairy tales 
are published. Although the magazines, novels and fairy tales were often 
guided by a moral demand for improvement, they offered young people 
perspectives that were largely absent in the past. Young people were now the 
subjects of narrative, rather than the objects of prose. Moreover, young people 
engaged not simply with adults, but with other young people. The young were 
given character and voice. Dialogues were held between the young. Whatever 
the authority of the adult author, a centripetal force had emerged in the 
context of that authority. A dialogic space for children pulled against a historic 
adult monologism (cf. Bakhtin). 
 
In the late eighteenth century, alongside the growing children’s fiction, the 
publication of encyclopaedias and taxonomic collections for children emerged 
as a new cultural form. In 1770 Francis Newbery published The Natural 
History of Birds by T. Teltruth, which contained appropriated passages from 
Thomas Boreman’s Description of Three Hundred Animals (1730). The Good 
Childs Cabinet of Natural History (published in 1801 by John Wallis, 
London) contains chapters on Beast, Birds, Fishes, Insects and Flowers and 
within each chapter a series of images and descriptions of particular species.3 
                                            
3 It is in many ways unsurprising that in the same year, 1801, that The Good Childs Cabinet of Natural 
History was published, Victor of Aveyron was discovered wandering the hills and fields of southern 
France. Victor the ‘wild child’ – for all the efforts of Lucien Bonnaterre, Jean Itard and Madame Guerin in 
trying to lead the boy into language, moral sensibility and pose, manners and social taste and 
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Darton, in his five century survey of children’s literature in England, tells us 
that natural histories for children would bear the generic traces of a wide 
range of literary forms, such as collections of fables, ‘decayed history’, 
fabulous monsters and fairy tales. This genre of writing for children might be 
seen as ‘legend’ (cf. Foucault, 1970), but it also demonstrates an 
understanding of children in the context of scientific enquiry and construes 
children as subjects of scientific experiment and investigation. The child is 
constituted with the authority of the scientific gaze. They are able to bear 
witness to nature. They are authorised to give testimony to the empirical 
before them and to have credibility conferred to their experience. But equally 
this is a science of the marvellous real, both fact and spectacle. Although the 
children’s encyclopaedia takes the form of tabular expression, its 
nomenclature and the ordering of its signified are ‘non-scientific’. Its content 
in this sense is mythic and popular. It is a marvellous natural history. 
 
The emergence and development of a domain of literary experience for 
children was predicated then on an ability to move from a stage illiteracy to 
literacy, from infancy to childhood.4 Far from being, as Neil Postman (1979) 
                                                                                                                             
gentlemanly association – was forever unable to escape his infancy and muteness. He is forever 
associated with the garden, the woods, the floors, the filth, the grunts and animal demands, and the hot 
potatoes (Bonnaterre, 1800; Itard, 1801; Lane, 1976; Malson, 1972). 
 
4 The growth in periodical, novelistic, and scientific literatures for children is made possible in the 
nineteenth century due to demographic changes and increased rates of literacy. In the UK child labour 
was commonplace and there was a high infant mortality rate. But from 1801, the date of the first census, 
to 1871 (one year after the public provision of schooling), the British population increased from 8.9 
million to 22.7 million. This was due to a fall in the death rate and an increase in the birth rate. The early 
nineteenth century also witnessed an increase in the rates of literacy in the British population and an 
increase in religious revivalism. In the 1830s three-quarters of working-class homes possessed books, 
mainly religious. In 1801 13.8 percent of all working-class children between five and fifteen attended 
Sunday schools, but by 1851 the figure was 75.4 percent. Although illiteracy was not a ‘primary 
obstacle’ to children’s engagement with a children’s literary culture (cf. Drotner, 1988: 31), it – alongside 
‘a taste for debased, sensational fiction’ – was identified as a pathology (Donald, 1992: 53). Such 
concerns only intensified as the century progressed and the new one began. As James Donald argues 
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has argued, a means of differentiating adulthood from childhood, literacy and 
literary culture for children – and hence the emergence of a cultural medium 
that makes visible children as a collective experiential subject - is made 
possible only because children have access to a world of literary signification, 
to a form of signification that is mobile and translatable, a ‘literary culture’ 
that is both literary and visual (in the sense that it is both of the ‘gram’ and the 
pictorial). 
 
In the context of the question of experience two things are important. Firstly, 
the adoption of literary signification for the child is both a transition from 
infancy to childhood, but also seen as a necessary perversion of the primary 
experiential relation between infant and world. In this respect both Rousseau 
and Locke agree on the ‘imperfection’ of words (cf. Rose, 1984: 46). 
Jacqueline Rose in her work on children’s fiction notes the importance of 
Locke in the innovation in pedagogic publishing for children; she refers to the 
publication in 1756 of A Little Lottery Book for Children, containing a new 
method for playing them into a knowledge of the letters as a demonstration 
of Locke’s idea of pictorial language. But she states that Locke’s proposal for 
an intimacy between word and image (that is now so typical of young 
children’s books) ‘was inseparable from a deep suspicion of written language, 
and a desire to hold the written word as closely as possible to the immediacy 
of the visual image’ (Rose, 1984: 46). [We might add the Locke talks about an 
immediacy not simply to the image, but also to the thing and to play cf. Locke, 
                                                                                                                             
‘[t]he illiterate became the target of the “administered” forms in which the standard language and the 
national literature were taught in the elementary schools set up after Forster’s Education Act in 1870’ 
(Donald, 1992: 53). 
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Some Thoughts Concerning Education.] Rose also notes that in Rousseau’s 
Emile ‘the child is being asked not only to retrieve a lost state of nature, but 
also to take language back to its pure and uncontaminated source in the 
objects of the immediate world... [T]he constant stress throughout [is] on the 
purity of the visual sign...Whether it is a case of physical gesture and 
expression, or of pointing out objects in the real world, what matters is that 
signs should immediately speak’ (Rose, 1984: 47-8). For Locke, infants are 
experiential subjects (i.e. they have the capacity for experience and to be 
experienced) and it is only by virtue of their being so that ‘human 
understanding’ is possible. For Locke, but also for Rousseau, our relation to 
the empirical is necessarily mediated by the condition of maturity. Although 
Montaigne may have posed experience in the context of maturity and death, it 
is Rousseau and Locke who frame experience in the context of infancy and 
signification. 
 
Secondly, as also pointed out by Rose: ‘[l]anguage for children – how it is 
spoken both by and to the child – is subject to strictures, and characterised by 
differences, which need first to be located inside the institution where 
language is systematically taught. This is an issue which bears on our 
relationship, not only to children’s writing, but to literature as a whole – the 
fact that language has an institutional history which determines how it is 
written, spoken, and understood’ (Rose, 1985: 89). My concern here is not 
with the institutionalisation of a dominant literacy or the shaping of an 
English literature, but with the configuration of a medium (literary culture) as 
a medium of children’s experience in the context of ‘nationalisation’, 
‘standardisation’ and agencies of the state. Certainly the school was important, 
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but so were other institutions of welfarist state policy (cf Sommerville, 1982; 
Hendrick, 1997). In this sense, through the historic capacities and capabilities 
of the nation-state (cf. Sassen, 2006), a collective experiential subjectivity for 
children was able to be formed. This subjectivity is to be differentiated from 
earlier framings of experiences for the child inasmuch as this experiential 
domain is collective (i.e. children’s experiences) and it is formed through the 
territorialisation of the nation-state. To talk about the emergence of children’s 
experience is not to produce children within the unitary category of childhood. 
The category of ‘childhood’ is an empty category, devoid of the experiential. 
Moreover, children’s experience is not constituted through the symbolic. It is 
not a ‘discursive’ production and nor is it an ‘imagined community’. On the 
contrary, its standardisation is through a series of ‘social’ practices whose 
relationality is through a set of indexical and contingent connections. Thus, 
the relationality between literacy, schooling, and children’s literature does not 
constitute a unitary domain, a domain understood through a single measure 
or sign. Rather the connections made constitute a ‘plane of consistency’ 
(across fields of social productivity both eventful and non-eventful). Children 
as a collective experiential subject is a multitude, a multiplicity.  
 
4. Considerations 
There are three issues to consider: a) the child was the object, not subject, of 
experience prior to this moment; b) the focus on the child’s body as a site of 
experience is not counter to the circulation of the child as an image (i.e. as in 
much sociology of childhood), but both are correlatives of each other;  c) and 
that subjectivity is typified not by a performativity, but by a generationality of 
body matters. Let me address each very briefly in turn. 
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 a) From Object to Subject; From Singular to Plural 
Many social and cultural historians concerned with antiquity and the medieval 
period have been critical of any sociological and social historical simplicity. 
Without falling into the false binary of the social against the natural, a group 
of French medieval historians have argued and demonstrated how concern for 
the child was clearly evident in Europe from the fifth to the early sixteenth 
centuries (cf. Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999; Fossier, 1997; Riché and 
Alexandre-Bidon 1994; see also Orme, 2001). Children are documented in 
their everyday lives in the context of the church, in places of education and 
learning, in the family, at work, in the castle and on the streets (cf. Alexandre-
Bidon and Lett, 1999; Riché and Alexandre-Bidon 1994). There is no doubt 
that there were understandings in the medieval period of what a child was and 
how to care for it. The ‘raising’ (tollere, to take up) of the child by the father in 
order to hold-off the threat of abandonment was more than a literal act at the 
birth of an infant, it was also a metaphor for the growth of the child (Boswell, 
1988). 
 
That the infant and the child were the object of experience and discourse is 
not at issue – and we could look further back in time to the ancient Greeks 
and Romans (cf. Dixon, 2001; Becchi and Julia, 1998a and 1998b) or further a 
field geographically. What is at stake is that in these accounts provided by 
medieval and other historians is that the child is by and large (although not 
exclusively) in the singular (i.e. a son or daughter, or a child learning, and so 
on) and lacking any experiential subjectivity (i.e. children are not, by and 
large, subjects of the accounts provided, whether as authors or as actors). If I 
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can poach from Deleuze here, the child has long been constituted as ‘a life’ (cf. 
Deleuze, 2001). The child has long been ‘a child’, a child with ‘no name’ and 
yet one who ‘can be mistaken for no other’ (Deleuze, 2001: 29). Children have 
long been seen as objects of affect and affection. The problem of children’s 
experience does not introduce the problem of intimacy toward the child nor 
even the reciprocal feelings for the adult (as parent or teacher). We know that 
just is not the case (cf. Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999).  But what it does do 
is situate children’s affections for each other on a horizontal plane. Only when 
children have experience do they have particularity; only then do they escape 
the confines of being ‘a pure event’ and become non-eventful, everyday, un-
instituted and significant. 
 
b) Children’s Experience is Embodied Because it Circulates as Sign 
The opposition between body and image is crude and many - from 
Canguilhem, Foucault, Haraway, Latour, and others - have countered any 
philosophy of the image that construes the sign as the death of soma (cf. 
Oswell, 2006). In that light we should read Aries’s classic account from the 
diaries of the physician Heroard of the infant dauphin Louis XIII not in the 
context that poses a social constructionist argument against a biologistic one, 
but in the context of an emerging focus on the body of the child, such that that 
focus is provided by a circulation of signs and interests. For Aries, Heroard’s 
writings indicate a complete lack of modesty toward the infant Louis XIII. He 
states that ‘[n]o other document can give us a better idea of the non-existence 
of the modern idea of childhood at the beginning of the seventeenth century’ 
(Aries, 1960/1986: 98). Before that time there were certainly child prostitutes 
and adults that preyed on young children’s vulnerability. Girls in domestic 
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servitude were often open to abuse and once ‘dishonoured’ many found their 
way to the streets and the brothels (Alexandre-Bidon and Lett, 1999). 
However, it is significant that the sexualisation of the young dauphin is 
recounted by a physician and that his account is a vivid demonstration of the 
relationship of the sovereign palace household to the body of the young, naked 
and bare child. Heroard’s account marks the beginning of a new relationship 
to the child, one that describes and catalogues and visualises their body along 
a scale from sexualised fantasies to medical definition (cf. Foucault, 1979).  
 
Cultural historians, such as Ludmilla Jordanova, have talked about the 
popularisation of medicine in the eighteenth century in such a way that does 
not simply repress the child’s body under the weight of discourse, but 
demonstrates how that body – in all its complexity – is articulated and re-
articulated (Jordanova, 1986). Equally, Carolyn Steedman’s history of a 
relationships between the development of physiology and childhood shows 
how in the mid-Victorian years in Britain there was an elision of ‘growth and 
childhood and childhood and death’, that ‘is to say that by embodying the 
problem of growth and disintegration in children, children become the 
problem they represented: they become the question of interiority’ (Steedman, 
1994: 76). There are very many good reasons, then, for thinking about the 
emergence of children’s experiential subjectivity as fundamentally bio-
political (cf. Foucault, 1979 and 2003). 
 
c) The Generationality of Body Matters 
Steedman’s historical analysis of the interiority of the child and the problem of 
growth is central to our understanding of children as a collective experiential 
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subject, but also to a more general sense of experience as growth. A notion of 
growth as interior to the body of the child is to be distinguished from earlier 
ecclesiastical writings on original sin and infancy (i.e. what has wrongly been 
seen as a problem of innocence and experience) and natural philosophical 
work on predetermination (i.e. the problem of the homunculus). For example, 
in relation to the former, recent work on St Augustine (whose  writings initiate 
the medieval discussion of original sin) show how he constructs the infant not 
as one who commits actual sinful acts (i.e. not guilty of specific sins), but as a 
‘non-innocent’ (i.e. one whose soul is informed by the sin of Eve) whose 
baptism brings the infant into the community of the Christian church (cf. 
Stotz, 2001; Traina, 2001). It is only as the infant develops speech that the 
child becomes accountable for their actions and is thus capable of actual sin. 
And in relation to the latter, preformationism holds that the embryo is not a 
moment of creativity and growth, but a point of sameness with the soul of 
parent. The embryo and later the infant and child are merely larger versions of 
the same soul that is enclosed in the soul of the forbearers and their forbearers 
and so on. 
 
In contrast then, the generationality of interiorised life becomes a condition of 
the experiential relations of children in the nineteenth century. The 
nineteenth century physiological writings on development and interiority fold 
growth into the body of the child but only inasmuch as this constitutes a 
collective experience for all children. Moreover, literary culture – as a plane of 
consistency, a condition of existence for children’s collective experiential 
subjectivity – constitutes character as the basis of interiorised life. For 
children to have speech (i.e. organised voice), that speech must be expressive 
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of an interiorised life. In contrast to any notion of a performativity that stages 
life according to any directorial (and centrifugal) authority, literary culture 
performs children as themselves performative and the matter upon which any 
performance is actualised is growing (i.e. it has generationality). 
 
5. Civil Institutionalisation and the Noise of Speech 
To construct children as an experiential subject is to construct them with 
speech (i.e. to undo the claim that others have had of them in formation of 
dialogue – speech and counter-speech). To do so, leaves short the unspeaking, 
the infant. In his ‘Preface’ to the English translation of Infancy and History 
(1993), Agamben refers to  Aristotle’s distinction between voice and language 
(or speech). Agamben talks about the difference between phone and logos as 
that which ‘opens the very space of ethics’ ( Agamben, 2007: 8) and he talks 
about that space as ethical inasmuch as it is one that cannot be articulated. 
The expression Agamben uses to not-link voice to speech (phone to logos), 
ethics to politics, is that of the ‘moat of infancy’. The space in-between is what 
in the body of the main essay Agamben argues ‘coincides with that historico-
transcendental region – before the subject of language and without somatic 
substance – which we have defined above as infancy’ (ibid: 67). Infancy, then, 
for Agamben is between nature and culture, between voice and organised 
speech, and between the household and the political realm. He says ‘[i]nfancy 
is an experimentum linguae of this kind, in which the limits of language are to 
be found not outside language, in the direction of the referent, but in an 
experience of language as such, in its pure self-reference’ (Agamben, 2007: 6). 
For Agamben infancy is a way of understanding the limit of language, not as 
the ineffable, but as ‘something superlatively sayable: the thing of language’ 
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(ibid: 4). And although this is beyond Agamben, thinking the thing of 
language requires that language itself is much more than word alone, much 
more than phoneme as sound-image; the experience of language itself must 
include both the formal and the substantive (cf. Oswell, 2006). 
 
If infancy stands before language, it is not as an absence to be represented. 
Maturity and experience do not follow the sublation of presence and absence, 
of representation; rather they move through translation. Children’s voices are 
translated in their presence and in the presence of their infancy. Infancy is not 
that which is foregone in order to speak. It is neither household nor polis; it is 
to speak from ones genealogy. It is not simply that infants literally have no 
speech, but that children have no organised speech. Children may have 
collective experience, but they have no authority in the political realm. They 
have no civil institutions. And although there are plenty of adults who speak 
for their experiences in civil society, children have no political speech. In that 
sense, the invocation of children as a collective experiential subject needs to 
be posed in the context of their lack of institutionalisation. Children have 
associational relationality but no institutional authority. This might be posed 
in terms of a democratic deficit and calls by adults for more representation. 
But children suffer from a surplus of representation; they don’t need more. 
Children don’t need more clarity or transparency for their voice. In many ways 
they already have this. Any shift from associational experience to civil 
institutionalisation for children should only add the capacity to make noise, to 
add substance to their voices, to add the capacity for interference. It should 
allow them to interfere and move between social relations and to extend their 





To conclude by returning to the topic of the day, I want simply to say that 
what is empirical needs to be framed, not in an abstract philosophical context 
of the contemporary nature of social fact (or factishes cf. Latour), but in the 
context of the genealogical emergence of subjects of experience: namely, of 
subjects of experience that can bear witness to a changing world and for whom 
a world is disclosed. This is not to return to a latent humanism, but it is to 
recognise that any talk of objects and technologies as having agency and as 
having objectity (in the Latourian sense of the recalcitrance of objects) needs 
equally to provide an account of how these things have become social and 
cultural subjects. In the absence of a convincing account of that genealogy, 
any talk of a parliament of things needs to be tempered with an understanding 
of the limited authority of their witness... Either that or to provide an account 
of the empirical that is disarticulated from the experiential: namely, facts (or 
fictions) without subjects. 
